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Highlights
Air Traffic Management in Europe could be performing better – and 
if it were, it would reduce delays, ticket prices and the environmental 
impact of air transport. The EU’s Single European Sky (SES) legislation 
has introduced a performance scheme which defines mandatory 
performance targets for the Air Navigation Service Providers of EU 
Member States.
But, the process of defining the targets is complex and regulation is 
becoming ever more detailed. Are there ways to make this process 
simpler? Are the incentives of the schemes properly aligned? And is 
this type of ‘economic regulation’ even the right tool to address the 
challenges of the sector?
The targets for the upcoming five-year Reference Period are currently 
being defined. On this occasion the 9th Florence Air Forum gathered 
the relevant stakeholders in Florence to discuss the theoretical basis 
as well as ideas for the practical improvement of the SES Performance 
Scheme.
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How to Better Align the Performance 
Scheme?
A Comment by Matthias Finger
This European Transport Regulation Observer reflects 
upon the discussions at the 9th Florence Air Forum
‘The Single European Sky Performance Scheme’ that took 
place in Florence on 15 May, 2017.
Air Traffic Management (ATM) is – at least until 
now – a monopoly, and as such it needs to be 
regulated. The European Commission has come up 
with a so-called performance scheme to regulate this 
monopoly. The Performance Review Body (PRB) 
advises and supports the Commission in setting up 
binding performance targets and thereby, in a way, 
acts as the regulator for ATM at the European level1.
The performance scheme itself has a long history: its 
origins go back to the first Single European Sky (SES) 
package in 2004, which had four pillars, namely 
technology (which was delegated to SESAR), safety 
(delegated to EASA), capacity and performance, 
for which the then called Performance Review 
Commission (PRC) was created. This Commission 
issued a report in 2006, in which it recommended 
the creation of a performance scheme with 
concrete indicators. This performance scheme was 
subsequently integrated into the second SES package 
of 2009. To recall, this second package strengthened 
the Functional Airspace Blocks (FABs), which later 
turned out not to be that functional at all. It also 
created the central network management function 
which was delegated to Eurocontrol (see below), 
and it created an airport pillar with an Airport 
Capacity Observatory. And finally, as said, it set up 
the first reference period (RP1) of the performance 
scheme (2012-2015). In 2013, a new document 
entitled Accelerating the implementation of the Single 
European Sky was issued by the Commission, which 
later resulted in the SES II+ proposal. In it, the 
Commission aimed at strengthening the national 
supervisory authorities, at reinforcing the network 
manager (Eurocontrol) and at enforcing the existing 
rules. But it became obvious that the European 
1. Tasks of the PRB are defined in COMMISSION IMPLEMENTING 
REGULATION (EU) No 390/2013
airspace could not really be defragmented and that 
the SES project had somewhat ended up in gridlock. 
Yet, in the absence of competition, everybody agreed 
that the performance scheme was the right regulatory 
approach. It was therefore agreed to engage in a 
second reference period (RP2, 2016-2019).
This 9th Florence Air Forum thus comes at the 
mid-term of the RP2. This is the time when the 
Commission is now planning for the third reference 
period (RP3, 2020-2025), for which some of the 
indicators chosen can be revised and the reference 
scheme can still be improved. The role of the Forum 
was, therefore, to critically look at the past and to 
highlight some perspectives for the next RP3. The 
following four considerations are especially worth 
mentioning and have to be taken into account during 
the next RP3:
• To recall, the performance scheme has four 
dimensions: environment, cost, delays (capacity) 
and safety. It would be worth examining whether 
the performance targets of each of these four 
dimensions are actually aligned, so as to give a 
coherent message to the regulated Air Navigation 
Service Providers (ANSPs). For instance, there is 
a correlation between cost savings and capacity 
improvements, as reducing delays by improving 
capacity normally creates additional cost. 
Furthermore, some data presented at the Forum 
seem to suggest that ANSPs are increasing their 
revenues without investing further into capacity.
• More generally, not only is ATM regulated but so 
too are airlines and especially airports, which are 
the other monopoly in the air transport system; 
it would be worth thinking about aligning the 
regulation of ATM or ANSPs with the regulation 
of airports. For instance the provision of tower 
services by national ANSPs is a way to cross 
subsidize regional airports. Auctioning of tower 
services could make this more transparent.
• The performance scheme is one of the incentive 
mechanisms for ANSPs; but there are others. For 
example, SESAR is creating all kinds of incentives 
by supporting technological developments. Are 
these incentives aligned with the incentives 
that the ANSPs are receiving from the PRB? 
Perhaps a closer link could be provided by 
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directly incentivizing the application of SESAR 
technologies in collaboration with other ANSPs. 
This could be done by somehow changing the 
focus from individual ANSP performance to 
system-wide performance.
• During the RP2, the activities of the network 
manager (Eurocontrol) were included into the 
performance scheme. However, the activities 
of an ANSP and the activities of a network 
manager are quite different, and it would be 
worth examining whether to differentiate the 
performance scheme for these two types of 
actors.
Everybody agrees that competition in ATM is the 
right tool to achieve the SES. However, there is 
gridlock of the SES, and competition will come 
from technological developments rather than from 
institutional changes. Furthermore, SESAR and 
other forces are promoting important technological 
developments in ATM, leading to new ways of 
providing ATM. The performance scheme must take 
these technological dynamics into account, namely 
by creating incentives that adopt such technologies, 
rather than stifling them. 
In my opinion, the performance scheme could set 
further incentives for ANSPs to invest in modern 
technology, and it should actually incentivize 
technological developments in general.
Namely, it should establish a rewarding mechanism 
for those ANSPs that make a shift from CAPEX 
to OPEX. This would steer ANSPs towards 
procuring services rather than investing in physical 
infrastructure. More precisely, the performance 
scheme should incentivize the sharing of ATM 
infrastructures to ultimately make progress towards 
at least some centralized services across the EU. 
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A Summary of Discussions2
The 9th Florence Air Forum addressed the issue of the 
Single European Sky (SES) Performance Scheme. The 
Performance Scheme is part of the SES regulation and 
consists of binding performance targets for national 
ANSPs that are set at an EU level. Given the upcoming 
redefinition of the Scheme for the next Reference Period 
(RP) beginning in 2020 the Forum addressed four essential 
questions:
• Principles of economic regulation: what can we learn 
from the theory? What can we learn from other 
sectors?
• The Performance Scheme: can it be improved?
• The Charging Scheme: how to incentivise efficiency?
• Setting the targets for RP3: how can we make the 
process simpler?
Principles of economic regulation: what 
can we learn from the theory? What can we 
learn from other sectors?
Progress in the SES is long overdue, and achieving better 
performance has also been discussed at previous Florence 
Air Forums. The focus on the Performance and Charging 
Scheme was chosen based on the current development of 
the redefinition of targets for the next RP but also because 
it provides an occasion to discuss the theoretical basis 
of such economic regulation. This context of regulatory 
economics provided grounds for a cross-sectoral 
comparison and the presentation of different types of past 
experiences. From an economic perspective, it seems useful 
to analyse the situation through the lens of rational choice 
as the “union bargaining model” proposes. However, 
several complexifying elements, most importantly the 
involvement of many different actors and the multi-layered 
institutional structure, need to be taken into account.  As 
in other network industries, technological development 
will play a decisive role in the development of the sector.
The Performance Scheme aims at promoting the efficiency 
of the European Air Traffic Management (ATM) sector but 
also at promoting a set of reforms in line with the SES. 
2.  For more details on the content of the presentations given at the 9th Flor-
ence Air Forum, the summary of presentation and the presentation files 
are available for download.
A key element is the introduction of competition in the 
sector, in some form. While the Performance Scheme does 
not prescribe specific organisational models, the push for 
increased efficiency should lead to the introduction of 
market elements at least in parts of the industry.
ATM is a monopolistic network industry. Therefore 
comparisons to other network industries can be drawn. 
There is, as in electricity, the option of introducing 
competition “for the market” by putting certain services out 
for competitive tendering. Another form of competition in 
ATM could be cross-national competition where service 
providers in different countries compete for air traffic.
Tendering services has been a success, for instance, in 
the local water sector where overall costs were brought 
down thanks to the competitive tendering of the multi-
annual contracts for the provision of fresh and waste 
water services. Another comparison was drawn to airport 
regulation: here a price cap regulation has been successful 
in bringing down prices. The case of Dublin airport was 
pointed out: even after heavy investments in infrastructure, 
airport charges remained low. In the rail sector, conversely, 
even after many years of reforms, regulators have not 
been able to significantly bring down costs overall. In 
the telecommunication industry technology eventually 
allowed for real competition and significant price 
reductions for consumers. 
Part of the discussion addressed why in ATM specifically, 
the reform process has been slow. Arguments could be 
summed up in three key elements:
1. Financial disincentives:  all ANSPs in the EU are still 
state owned entities. Governments being their owners 
lack the incentive to push for reforms that would 
decrease ANSPs’ revenues.  
2. Industry structure: in the ATM field there is, to some 
extent, collusion between providers and suppliers of 
ATM equipment. This system is resiliently protecting 
itself from outsider entries.
3. The social question: given the power of Air traffic 
controller unions a reform that would diminish the 
personnel’s future role is faced with strong resistance.
There was agreement that technology will be the 
most important driving factor in any future market 
developments. Most importantly, technologies related 
to ATM systems for drones are not in the picture in the 
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current discussion within the established ATM industry. 
Experience in other network industries has shown that 
availability of technology can start a process of market-
based reform. Therefore, the SES RP3 should incentivise 
interoperability, comparability and technological 
innovation throughout the air transport industry. 
Connected to the technological component, a prominent 
claim in the discussions was that the Performance 
Scheme needs to be closely linked to SESAR, incentivising 
concretely the uptake of technologies developed by this 
program. Such a closer link would be imperative also from 
a taxpayer perspective.
The Performance Scheme: can it be 
improved?
The second panel discussion was focused on a general 
overview of the SES Performance Scheme, and future 
development for the next RP. Some concrete examples 
as well as general observations were made during the 
discussion.
The Performance Scheme defines performance targets for 
ANSPs in four areas: safety, environment, airspace capacity 
and cost efficiency. The discussion mainly focused on the 
latter two areas.
One concrete proposal that was discussed with some 
controversy is the issue of introducing more dynamic 
pricing of ATM services, meaning charging higher 
prices for airspace use during peak hours. According to 
advocates of this proposal, airlines would be more inclined 
to contribute to a better usage of capacity. Airlines did not 
agree with this argument and pointed to scheduling issues 
such a system would cause. Overall there was agreement 
that this proposal can, if at all, only marginally contribute 
to a better usage of airspace capacity.
The problem of how to use the Performance Scheme 
to achieve a better or more optimal use of existing 
airspace capacity was central to the discussion. While 
there was agreement that there is currently a mismatch 
between capacity and demand, opinions diverged over 
the strategies to address the issue. The mismatch results, 
in part, from capacity planning that is not centralised. 
Therefore there are times in which there are not enough 
controllers available for some areas whereas in other zones 
controllers had nothing to do. Especially during night 
time certain zones could, in theory, be closed making the 
capacity available at other areas. The proposal of flight-
centric operations, which had already been discussed at 
past Florence Air Forums, was mentioned as a promising 
solution if implemented on a cross-national level. 
Another element discussed regards investments. According 
to some discussants, the current system incentivises 
underinvestment for ANSPs as a way to maximise their 
economic surplus. According to numbers presented, 
ANSPs have in fact increased their revenues over the past 
RP. It was pointed out that this is, in a way, good news 
because it proves the Performance Scheme is working. 
The increased revenues are, however, not matched with 
increased investments. There is the question of whether 
the Scheme fails to address capital expenditure (CAPEX) 
as part of the cost-sharing system. This was discussed in 
more detail during the following panel.
A proposal that was also present at past Air Forums is that 
the Performance Scheme incentivises the introduction 
of new technologies, namely remote services: if the 
Performance Scheme would incentivise operational 
expenditure (OPEX) over CAPEX this could speed up the 
introduction of shared data centres, which are a promising 
technology to lower system costs.
Finally, it was underlined that integrating the (post-Brexit) 
UK and Turkey in the future Scheme is essential as both 
countries represent a large share of traffic going in and out 
of the EU.
The Charging Scheme: How to Incentivise 
Efficiency?
The targets set under the Performance Scheme are the basis 
for the charges determined by the Charging Scheme. The 
Charging Scheme aims at providing a transparent regime 
of charging for ATM en-route and terminal services. It 
was discussed how to change some of the features of the 
Scheme. For instance, the current traffic risk sharing and 
cost sharing arrangements could be modified. Currently, 
the cost sharing provides an incentive for ANSPs as they 
are entitled to retain any surpluses if their costs fall below 
what was stated at the beginning of the RP. Conversely, if 
their costs turn out to be higher, the additional costs are 
borne by the ANSP. Certain costs are, however, excluded 
from this arrangement, such as costs for pension schemes 
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the Commission for approval by the Single European Sky 
committee, which is part of the comitology procedure.
One suggestion was to look at whether all performance 
areas were equally important. There were also proposals 
on simplifying the system by essentially excluding all areas 
that have been successfully opened to the market. 
The targets that are set are based on data mainly provided 
by Eurocontrol that is then translated into concrete figures 
allowing for the requirement to lower delays to a specific 
figure. For many regions, that figure is zero and there is 
always discussion as to what number is achievable and 
what number provides enough incentives. This approach 
could also be changed, for instance to defining, across 
the board, an aim for average delay per flight. Data and 
indicators are available yet it would need to be decided 
which aspects need to be tackled.
Another element in this discussion revolved around 
the question which actor in the SES system can be the 
one pushing for higher ambition. As it was stated in the 
other panels, performance targets are formulated based 
on different sources of data and with the involvement of 
various actors. At the end, however there is a need for 
somebody with adequate information that is pushing for 
more ambitious targets. In a way, airlines are the ones 
most directly affected and they should make their voice 
heard even more. Institutionally, it will be the European 
Commission but with an even stronger push coming 
from the PRB, which should grow in independence and 
expertise, in the future.
ANSPs remarked that a lot of ambition has already come 
from within ANSPs. There were many references to the 
improvements achieved, especially in the area of delays, 
over the past decades. In fact, ANSPs are already striving 
to become more efficient and have internalised the goals 
set by the Commission. Some ANSPs, however, criticised 
the lack of a clear strategy for the future of the sector as a 
whole: as was obvious during the discussion, there is a mix 
of goals on the one hand, and regulatory tools deployed, on 
the other. ANSPs need certainty as to whether the future 
ATM industry will be a heavily regulated sector, a fully 
liberalised sector with open competition, or a European 
centralised sector, possibly served by one European ANSP. 
These very different long-term visions need to be spelled 
out more clearly so the responsible managers can act 
accordingly.
and costs incurred by Eurocontrol; furthermore, there is 
an inflation adjustment.
Another element was the future of traffic risk allocation. 
Traffic risk refers to the risk of actual traffic volumes being 
below or above the estimated figures at the beginning of 
the RP. There was the suggestion to exclude this aspect 
from the Performance Scheme. The source of traffic data 
may be an important element for this: it was mentioned 
that without the capacity to collect and create their own 
figures about traffic development, regulators depend on 
ANSPs to provide such information. ANSPs become 
intentionally pessimistic about future demand because 
this can manipulate the price cap in their favour. This 
and other forms of “regulatory gaming” or cheating need 
to be addressed in a consistent way in the upcoming RP. 
It was also discussed whether ultimately ANSPs should 
bear the entire traffic risk: they would then be able to earn 
more if there is more demand provided they can offer the 
necessary capacity.
The discussion showed that the Performance Scheme is 
already very complex, and changing it may complicate it 
even further. This complexity has a cost: it was presented 
that currently the regulatory costs are between 5% and 
35% of the ANSPs´ cost base.
The incentives within the Scheme may also not be properly 
aligned. It was discussed that, for instance, delay targets 
may impact capacity: the incentive to lower average delay 
may dissuade ANSPs from accepting further traffic in their 
territory. This way it would incentivise less cooperative 
behaviour to the detriment of system-wide effectiveness.
The panel also discussed how the industry could become 
more efficient in the long run. The idea was discussed to 
further unbundle ANSPs and make competitive tendering 
obligatory for all ancillary services.
Setting the Targets for RP3: How Can we 
Make the Process Simpler?
Finally, discussions addressed some points related to 
procedural aspects. The process of defining targets is 
complex. Generally speaking, the Commission defines 
targets in the performance areas advised by the Performance 
Review Body (PRB): the PRB uses its expert knowledge 
to define targets. These targets are then translated into 
national performance plans which then are submitted to 
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A Regulatory Paradox in Aviation
Cathal Guiomard, Dublin City University Business 
School, Ireland
From the viewpoint of economics, in a monopoly or 
quasi-monopoly industry, service users can benefit from 
a price regulatory regime that, when successful, protects 
them from being over-charged. In other markets, 
regulation is inferior to the promotion of vigorous 
competition. 
As is well known, this lesson is resisted in European 
aviation - indeed, it is turned on its head. Where 
competition is difficult or not possible and therefore 
price regulation could be beneficial - in airports - it 
is not provided in the EU. But where competition is 
possible and regulation is not needed or harmful - in 
ATC - competition is prevented and regulation exists on 
a comprehensive scale. The result is to leave the airport 
sector without effective regulation and the ATC sector 
without competition. 
In the airport sector, there are many cities and regions 
with a single airport that has a considerable degree of 
dominance and market power, that is, scope for over-
pricing. Unless airport competition increases, there is 
an argument for price regulation in those parts of the 
airport sector with monopoly airports. A standard price 
cap regime would seem a straightforward tool to use.
In the air traffic control sector with no underlying 
problem as there are dozens of EU companies providing 
air navigation services (albeit currently only within their 
own national boundaries) regulation is not needed; 
competition can readily be delivered. 
Yet the EU Airport Charges Directive - a rather flimsy 
‘set of common principles’ for price setting - falls a long 
way short of binding price regulation.  
Meanwhile the Single European Sky, instead of imposing 
competition, offers a complex web of regulations that 
carve up of the ATC market into non-competing and 
purely artificial national monopolies. 
In both sectors, passengers are denied the lower charges 
that competition would bring while monopolists retain 
the ‘quiet life’ that Nobellist Sir John Hicks said was their 
ultimate goal. 
Why should this be so? Many other sectors across the 
economies of the EU have had either regulation or 
competition, as appropriate, imposed on them to the 
benefit of consumers.
One way to look at the issue is to say that utility 
companies are intermediate producers: downstream 
firms use the infrastructure provided by an upstream 
service provider. But this means one party’s income is 
another party’s costs. In the absence of large or steady 
independent increases in demand, cost reductions for 
users involve income losses for producers.  User costs 
can only be cut if provider revenues also fall. 
This is difficult if not impossible to achieve when the 
infrastructure providers are government-owned and 
so possess great influence in the corridors of political 
power. The result is likely to be - as, unfortunately, 
under the current SES programme - an absence of 
competition and a weak regulatory regime composed of 
small regulatory offices that are rarely fully independent 
implementing a ‘performance scheme’ that does not 
impose binding cost controls. 
In utility sectors where regulation or competition have 
been introduced - energy, telecommunications, other 
parts of transport - assets have more usually been 
privately owned and regulators have been more free to 
serve the consumer interest.
Recent meetings of the Florence Air Forum have 
discussed ATC and many contributors have judged the 
status quo to be short-sighted since the technological 
changes, already underway, could circumvent the 
current infrastructure and business models especially in 
combination with unmanned vehicles. 
The European ATM Master plan has set out a number 
of goals including a reduction in unit costs of 50%, a 
tripling of airspace capacity and an improvement of 20% 
in flight efficiency. Progress has been and is likely to 
remain marginal without turning EU aviation regulation 
‘the right way up’, with effective regulation for dominant 
airports and competition (tendering) in ATC.
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Further Readings
Florence School of Regulation Transport Area, 2017, 9th 
Florence Air Forum Summary of presentations
The Performance Scheme is the European Commission’s 
most important tool to tackle the inefficiencies of Euro-
pean Air Traffic Management (ATM). The Single Euro-
pean Sky (SES) is still in gridlock, yet the need to improve 
performance is recognized by all Member States. The 
second Reference Period (RP) (2015-2019) is drawing 
to a close and, given the complexities of setting up the 
performance targets, preparations for RP3 have already 
begun. The 9th Florence Air Forum discussed the most 
relevant aspects of the Performance Scheme including 
how it could be developed further. 
Representatives of the European Commission, major 
stakeholders as well as leading academics engaged in the 
discussions which addressed four central questions:
• Principles of economic regulation: what can we learn 
from the theory? What can we learn from other sec-
tors?
• The SES Performance Scheme: can it be improved?
• The Charging Scheme: how to incentivize efficiency?
• Setting the targets for RP3: how can we make the 
process simpler?
DG MOVE, 2017, Commission hearing on the preparation 
for RP3 – Report
This report summarises an open hearing that was held by 
the Commission on 14th December 2016 to hear the views 
of stakeholders across the aviation industry. The hearing 
built on the outcome of the stakeholder discussion on the 
Performance Review Body (PRB) White Paper that took 
place in Cologne in November 2016 and provided stake-
holders with a forum to provide forward-looking, con-
structive ideas for RP3. This paper summarises the dis-
cussions at the RP3 hearing. The discussion focussed on 
a keynote address from the Commission and two panel 
sessions to gather stakeholder views on the performance 
policy for RP3 and the second on the detail relating to 
measuring performance.
Performance Review Body of the Single European Sky, 
2016, PRB Annual Monitoring Report 2015
This Annual Monitoring Report 2015 is published by the 
Performance Review Body (PRB) of the Single European 
Sky (SES). It covers the first year of the second Reference 
Period (RP2) which runs for five years from 2015 to 2019. 
The report provides a summary of European Air Naviga-
tion Services performance achieved for 2015 in the four 
Key Performance Areas of safety, environment, capacity 
and cost-efficiency. It provides the opinion of the PRB 
on progress and makes recommendations where neces-
sary to the European Commission. It refers to, and uses 
data from, the States subject to the provisions of the SES 
Performance Scheme and data supplied by Eurocontrol.
Blondiau, T., Glazer, A., Proost, S., 2015, “Air Traffic 
Control Regulation with Union Bargaining”. Available 
at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=2655612 or http://
dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2655612
This paper studies the behaviour of the air traffic control 
(ATC) centres in the EU. It investigates the functioning 
of the European ATC sector with a union bargaining 
model. In this model, working conditions are the out-
come of a bargaining game between the public air traffic 
control agency and the unions of air traffic controllers. 
It uses this framework to understand the behaviour of 
the ATC centres for wage formation, their reactions to 
a price-cap, adoption of new technologies, congestion 
pricing, effect of vertical disintegration, competition 
and the possible success of mergers between different 
national ATC centres. The theory is able to explain the 
slow progress in ATC performance in a unionized envi-
ronment. The empirical analysis is based on actual ATC 
performance data.
Eurocontrol, 2017, Performance Review Commission 
(PRC) quarterly online, issue Jan-Jun 2017
The PRU is responsible for monitoring and reviewing the 
performance of the Pan-European Air Navigation Ser-
vice (ANS) system across a number of key performance 
areas. As part of the EUROCONTROL Agency, the PRU 
supports the independent Performance Review Com-
mission (PRC) in running the EUROCONTROL Perfor-
mance Review System and executing the associated PRC 
work programme with the appropriate level of independ-
ence. The PRU also provides support to the European 
Commission (EC) on the SES Performance and Charging 
Schemes.
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Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies
The Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies, created in 1992 and directed by Professor Brigid Laffan, aims to develop 
inter-disciplinary and comparative research on the major issues facing the process of European integration, European societies 
and Europe’s place in 21st century global politics. The Centre is home to a large post-doctoral programme and hosts major 
research programmes, projects and data sets, in addition to a range of working groups and ad hoc initiatives. The research 
agenda is organised around a set of core themes and is continuously evolving, reflecting the changing agenda of European 
integration, the expanding membership of the European Union, developments in Europe’s neighbourhood and the wider world.
FSR Transport 
The Florence School of Regulation (FSR) is a project within the European University Institute (EUI) focusing on regulatory 
topics. It works closely with the European Commission, and is a growing point of reference for regulatory theory and practice. It 
covers four areas: Communications and Media, Energy (Electricity and Gas), and Transport & Water.
The FSR-Transport Area’s main activities are the European Transport Regulation Forums, which address policy and regulatory 
topics in different transport sectors. They bring relevant stakeholders together to analyse and reflect upon the latest developments 
and important regulatory issues in the European transport sector. These Forums inspire the comments gathered in this European 
Transport Regulation Observer.
Complete information on our activities can be found online at:  fsr.eui.eu
Florence School of Regulation,  
Transport Area
Robert Schuman Centre  
for Advanced Studies
European University Institute
Via Boccaccio, 121
50133 Florence
Italy 
Contact:
FSR-Transport:
 fsr.transport@eui.eu
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